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Commentary 
Justice John Paul Stevens­
His Take on Takings 
Alan Weinstein 
INTRODUCTION 
Justice John Paul Stevens was ap­
pointed to the Supreme Court by 
President Gerald R. Ford and took his 
seat on the Court on December 19, 
1975. Stevens announced his retire­
ment on April 9, 2010, and his seat will 
be occupied by Solicitor General Elena 
Kagan, the former Harvard Law School 
dean who was confirmed on August 5. 
This commentary reviews and analyzes 
Stevens's role in shaping the Court's 
views on the takings issue in land use 
regulation. 
Justice Stevens's more than 34 years 
on the Court span almost the entire 
modern era of the Court's land use juris­
prudence. After the Court's two seminal 
rulings on the constitutionality of zoning 
in 1926 (upholding the constitutional­
ity of zoning against a facial challenge 
in Euclid)1 and in 1928 (striking down a 
zoning provision as applied to a particu­
lar property in Nectow)2 the Court effec­
tively withdrew from the arena of zoning 
litigation for almost 50 years, leaving the 
development of a body of law governing 
land use to the state courts. 
Not until 1974, 46 years after Nec­
tow, did the Court again consider the 
constitutionality of a zoning ordinance, 
upholding a zoning code's restrictive 
definition of "family" in Village ofBelle 
Terre. 3 Since its ruling in Belle Terre, the 
Court has decided more than 30 cases 
dealing with land use regulation or 
closely associated issues such as hous­
ing codes. John Paul Stevens is the only 
justice who was on the Court during the 
entire post-Belle Terre period in which 
the Court has defined the constitutional 
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boundaries for land use regulation. One 
of the two areas where Justice Stevens 
made his most significant contributions 
to the Court's land use jurisprudence 
involves takings. 4 
The chart on pages 6 and 7 provides 
a chronological view of the positions 
Justice Stevens took in each of these 
cases, which are discussed below. 
THE EARLY YEARS 
Justice Stevens's pivotal role in shap­
ing the Court's views on the takings 
issue has been discussed and analyzed 
previously, particularly by John Echev­
erria and Richard Lazarus5 in articles 
published in 2006, the year after Ste­
vens authored the majority opinions in 
Kelo6 and San Remo,7 two of the three 
takings cases decided by the Court in 
2005. Both authors credit Stevens with 
astutely crafting a majority that would 
favor his measured view of the takings 
clause rather than the doctrinaire "prop­
erty rights" view espoused by Justice 
Antonin Scalia. 
Justice Stevens only gradually grew 
into his role as the successful rival to 
Justice Scalia's property rights vision of 
the takings clause. In Penn Central,8 the 
Court's first land use regulatory takings 
case in the post-Belle Terre era, decided 
in 1978, Stevens, along with Chief 
Justice Warren Burger, joined Justice 
William Rehnquist's dissenting opinion 
that argued the landmark designation of 
New York's Grand Central Terminal was 
a taking. 
Six members of the Court rejected 
the takings claim, finding that neither 
the designation of individual land-
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marks (like Grand Central) as opposed 
to the designation of historic districts, 
nor the fact that the landmark commis­
sion had turned down Penn Central's 
application to construct a high-rise 
office building atop the terminal, con­
stituted a taking. Justice Rehnquist's 
dissent focused on the unfairness of 
landmark designation of selected in­
dividual buildings, which he saw as 
imposing substantial costs on relatively 
few property owners for the benefit of 
the city as a whole, concluding: "It is 
exactly this imposition of general costs 
on a few individuals at which the 'tak­
ing' protection is directed." 9 
Echeverria argues, and I concur, 
that there was no incongruity in Justice 
Stevens's joining with the dissent­
ers in Penn Central. ID A concern about 
whether a government regulatory pro­
gram applies generally, as opposed to 
singling out specific property owners 
for special burdens, has been a keynote 
of his takings jurisprudence. In Penn 
Central, Stevens's concern about not 
singling out particular property owners 
to bear burdens not generally shared 
by others was a major theme in Justice 
Rehnquist's dissent. Thus, Rehnquist's 
view was far more attractive to Stevens 
than the majority's argument that there 
was no taking because the designation 
of individual landmarks occurred in 
the context of a comprehensive plan to 
preserve structures of notable historic 
or aesthetic interest; the owner of any 
given landmark building enjoyed the 
benefits that accrued from the fact 
that many other buildings were also 
designated. 11 
In Moore, a municipal housing code made it a crime for a 
grandmother to have her own grandchild live in the home she 
shared with her son and his child because its narrow definition 
of "family" barred the two grandchildren from living together, 
because they were cousins rather than siblings. 
Over the next several years, Justice 
Stevens continued to vote with Chief 
Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist 
in takings cases. For example, in Kaiser 
Aetna, 12 decided a year after Penn Central, 
both Stevens and Burger joined Reh­
nquist's majority opinion, which found 
a taking when the federal government 
demanded that a private marina allow 
public access to a channel dredged so 
members of the marina could have ac­
cess to the ocean. Rehnquist's rationale 
for finding a taking in Kaiser Aetna, that 
requiring public access "would result in 
an actual physical invasion of the pri­
vately owned marina," 13 would become 
a "categorical" takings rule in 1982: 
Government action that results in a per­
manent physical occupation of property 
is always a taking. 14 Stevens, again with 
Rehnquist and the chief justice, agreed, 
joining Justice Marshall's majority 
opinion in Loretto finding that a govern­
ment regulation, which required certain 
property owners to allow cable providers 
to affix their equipment to the owners' 
buildings in exchange for a token fee, 
was a taking. As will be seen later in Ste­
vens's dissent in First English and major­
ity opinion in Tahoe-Sierra, the temporal 
aspect of a challenged regulation would 
be an important factor in Stevens's view 
of the takings clause, and so the per­
manence of the physical occupation in 
Loretto, in addition to the fact that only 
certain property owners were singled out 
under this statute, was no doubt a telling 
point for him. 
We can also see Justice Stevens's 
developing view of the takings clause 
in Agins15 and San Diego Gas & Electric 
Co., 16 the two takings cases decided 
between Kaiser Aetna and Loretto, and in 
Moore v. City ofEast Cleveland, 17 a 1977 
case involving a discriminatory housing 
ordinance. 
In Agins, Justice Powell's opinion 
for a unanimous Court rejected a facial 
challenge to a zoning ordinance that re­
stricted the density of development on 
the plaintiffs property. What makes the 
Agins opinion noteworthy, however, is 
that it announced a new "two-part" tak­
ings test: "The application of a general 
zoning law to particular property effects 
a taking if the ordinance does not sub­
stantially advance legitimate state inter­
ests ... or denies an owner economically 
viable use of his land ... [T]he question 
necessarily requires a weighing of pri­
vate and public interests." 18 It was no 
surprise that Justice Stevens joined this 
opinion since he had anticipated the 
substantive due process prong of Agins19 
in his concurring opinion in Moore. 
In Moore, a municipal housing code 
made it a crime for a grandmother to 
have her own grandchild live in the 
home she shared with her son and his 
child because its narrow definition of 
"family" barred the two grandchildren 
from living together, because they 
were cousins rather than siblings. Six 
members of the Court had no problem 
striking down the ordinance on substan­
tive due process grounds,20 but Justice 
Stevens's concurring opinion argued 
that the ordinance was actually a taking 
of Mrs. Moore's property. Stevens ar­
gued that Justice Sutherland's majority 
opinion in Euclid v. Ambler supported 
his view because it "fused the two ex­
press constitutional restrictions on any 
state interference with private property 
that property shall not be taken without 
due process nor for a public purpose 
without just compensation into a single 
standard: 'Before (a zoning) ordinance 
can be declared unconstitutional, (it 
must be shown to be) clearly arbitrary 
and unreasonable, having no substan­
tial relation to the public health, safety, 
morals, or general welfare."' 21 
In 1981, Justice Stevens, along with 
Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehn­
quist, joined Justice Blackmun's major­
ity opinion in San Diego Gas dismissing 
a takings claim on the ground that there 
had not been a final determination in 
the California courts as to whether a 
taking had occurred. What is interest­
ing about Stevens's position in San 
Diego Gas is that he, as well as Burger, 
declined to join Rehnquist's concur­
ring opinion that stated he "would have 
little difficulty in agreeing with much of 
what is said in the dissenting opinion of 
Justice Brennan." 22 
Justice Brennan's dissent, joined by 
Justices Stewart, Marshall, and Powell, 
argued that there had been a final rul­
ing below on the issue of whether a 
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compensatory remedy was required for 
a taking-the California Supreme Court 
had denied review of a lower court rul­
ing that no compensatory remedy was 
available for a taking-and that "once 
a court establishes that there was a 
regulatory 'taking,' the Constitution de­
mands that the government entity pay 
just compensation for the period com­
mencing on the date the regulation first 
effected the 'taking' and ending on the 
date the government entity chooses to 
rescind or otherwise amend the regula­
tion."23 The view that a "temporary tak­
ing" required payment of compensation 
would subsequently be "agreed with" 
by Justice Rehnquist in his majority 
opinion in First English,24 from which 
Stevens would dissent. His position in 
San Diego Gas suggested as much, and 
provided a strong hint that the temporal 
aspect of a challenged regulation would 
be an important factor in Stevens's view 
of the takings clause. 
The Court ruled on four more tak­
ings cases associated with land use, and 
one eminent domain case, between 
San Diego Gas and the "1987 Trilogy" 
of takings cases (Keystone, First Eng­
lish, and Nol/an), that would transform 
the Court's takings jurisprudence and 
clearly reveal Justice Stevens's views 
on the takings issue. But by 1985, these 
pre-Trilogy cases showed that Stevens 
no longer shared Justices Burger and 
Rehnquist's view of the takings clause. 
Justice Stevens continued to vote 
with Chief Justice Burger and Justice 
Rehnquist in the first two cases decided 
after San Diego Gas. As discussed above, 
Stevens joined Justice Marshall's major­
ity opinion in Loretto announcing that a 
permanent physical invasion of private 
property was a "categorical" per se tak­
ing. And in Midkiff, 25 a 1984 eminent do­
main case, he joined Justice O'Connor's· 
opinion for a unanimous Court, holding 
that a Hawaiian land reform measure 
enacted to remedy a concentration of 
land ownership was a lawful use of the 
eminent domain power. But the follow­
ing year, in Williamson County,26 Stevens 
wrote separately for the first time in 
a takings case and made clear that he 
saw the takings clause differently than 
Burger and Rehnquist. 
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One point on which Justice Stevens and Chief Justice 
Rehnquist disagreed in Keystone would play an important 
I role in future takings cases. 
Williamson County was the Court's 
third failed attempt in five years to rule 
on the question of whether a compen­
satory remedy was required if a court 
found there had been a temporary regu­
latory taking of private property. The 
Court's first two attempts, Agins and 
San Diego Gas, had failed on procedural 
grounds; Williamson County met the 
same fate. 27 Agins had effectively es­
tablished an "application requirement" 
ripeness rule for an as-applied com­
pensatory taking claim. In Williamson 
County, the Court added two additional 
ripeness requirements for an as-applied 
claim. 
Justice Blackmun's majority opinion, 
joined by Justices Burger, Rehnquist, 
Brennan, Marshall, and O'Connor, held 
that a federal court takings claim was 
not ripe until a claimant could demon­
strate that: (1) he had sought, and been 
denied, a variance from the challenged 
ordinance and (2) no compensatory 
takings remedy was available in state 
court. Because the plaintiff in William­
son County had failed to seek a variance, 
the majority ruled the case was not ripe, 
reversed a Tennessee court's award of 
compensatory damages for the alleged 
taking, and remanded the case without 
ruling on the compensatory question. 
Stevens, while concurring in the judg­
ment, wrote separately to oppose the 
concept that the takings clause required 
a compensatory remedy for a "tempo­
rary taking." 
Justice Stevens's concurring opinion 
claimed that the "[t]emporary harms 
resulting from a regulatory decision 
fall into two broad subcategories: (1) 
those that result from a deliberate deci­
sion to appropriate certain property for 
public use for a limited period of time 
and (2) those that are a by-product of 
governmental decision making." 28 Ste­
vens then argued that while the first 
subcategory "is correctly characterized 
as a 'temporary taking,' [t]he second 
subcategory is fairly characterized as an 
inevitable cost of doing business in a 
highly regulated society." 29 In Stevens's 
view, compensation is required only for 
the first subcategory. As long as govern­
ment has acted fairly and in good faith, 
delays in regulatory approvals caused by 
disputes over governmental decisions 
that impose costs on property owners 
do not require compensation, even if 
the government decision proved to be 
wrong. Stevens would ultimately garner 
a majority of the Court for this view 17 
years later in Tahoe-Sierra. 
A year after Williamson County, Jus­
tice Stevens broke with Justices Burger 
and Rehnquist to author the majority 
opinion in McDonald, Sommer & Frates v. 
Yolo County,30 in which the Court again 
declined to address the compensation 
question on ripeness grounds. In Yolo 
County, the plaintiff had claimed a tak­
ing after the denial of its subdivision 
proposal. Stevens's opinion held that 
the claim was not ripe because the 
decisions below in the California state 
courts "leave open the possibility that 
some development will be permitted" 31 
if the plaintiff submitted a second de­
velopment proposal; however, Stevens 
also noted that repeated "futile" ap­
plications need not be made. 32 Justice 
White's dissent, joined by Justices 
Burger, Powell and Rehnquist, argued 
that the subdivision denial was a final 
decision that effected a taking; but 
Rehnquist, joined by Powell, declined 
to join the final part of Justice White's 
dissent claiming that compensation was 
required for the temporary taking, argu­
ing that the compensation question in 
this case should first be addressed by 
the courts below. 
THE 1987 TAKINGS TRILOGY 
The Court finally addressed the com­
pensation question the next year in 
First English,33 one of the trilogy of tak­
ings cases the Court decided in 1987. 
The Court had seen only one new 
justice appointed since its last substan­
tive takings decision in Loretto in 1982, 
but that appointment was significant. In 
1986, Chief]ustice Burger announced 
his retirement and President Reagan 
nominated Justice Rehnquist as the 
new chief justice; D.C. Court of Appeals 
Judge Antonin Scalia took Rehnquist's 
seat. Justice Scalia quickly took a lead­
ing role as an advocate for the "property 
rights" view of the takings clause34 and 
for the following two decades he and 
Justice Stevens would be intellectual, 
and ultimately "political,'' adversaries 
on the takings question.35 
Justice Stevens's view prevailed in 
Keystone, the first takings case decided 
that term, while the view favored by 
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice 
Scalia prevailed in the next two, First 
English and Nol/an. In Keystone Bitumi­
nous Coal Association v. DeBenedictis,36 
Stevens's majority opinion upheld a 
Pennsylvania statute prohibiting mining 
that caused subsidence of the surface 
that was similar to the statute the Court 
had declared unconstitutional 65 years 
earlier in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Ma­
hon.37 Stevens distinguished Keystone 
from Pennsylvania Coal by stressing that 
the state legislature, in enacting the 
statute at issue in Keystone, sought to 
address important public interests by 
minimizing subsidence, whereas the 
act struck down in Pennsylvania Coal 
sought merely to balance the private 
economic interests of the coal compa­
nies against the private interests of the 
surface owners. Analyzing the statute 
under both the first prong of Agins and 
the numerous takings cases in which 
the Court denied takings claims when 
government "merely restrains uses of 
property that are tantamount to a public 
nuisance,"38 Stevens concluded that 
the statute served a substantial public 
interest in preventing activities similar 
to public nuisances, then found that the 
statute did not cause a deprivation in 
value significant enough to satisfy the 
burden required to find a regulatory tak­
ing under Agins's second prong. Rehn­
quist argued in dissent that there was 
no significant difference between the 
current statute and the act struck down 
in Pennsylvania Coal, so the 1922 deci­
sion was controlling and the statute was 
a i:aking of property. 
One point on which Justice Stevens 
and Chief Justice Rehnquist disagreed 
in Keystone would play an important 
role in future takings cases. The 
"segmentation" issue involves how 
the Court would define the property 
interest to be evaluated for takings 
purposes. The more narrowly a prop­
erty interest is defined the more likely 
a taking will be found. An example of 
this would be defining the property 
VOTES IN LAND USE TAKINGS CASES DURING JUSTICE STEVENS'S TENURE 
PiD'M'!tW@il11lii!498.....~...#lij!1iiift·lft®lll~ 
Moore claimed city housing ordinance 
Moore v. City of 
East Cleveland 
431 U.S. 494 (1977) 
violated due process clause of 14th 
Amendment; Ohio Ct. App. confirmed 
violation; Supreme Court reversed; 
ordinance bore no rational relationship to 
Powell, joined by 
Brennan, Marshall, 
Blackmun 
Brennan, joined by 
Marshall 
Stevens 
Burger 
Stewart, joined by 
Rehnquist, White 
permissible state objectives 
Penn Central v. City 
ofNew York 
438 U.S. 104 (1978) 
Penn Central appealed N.Y. Ct. App. 
decision holding city's landmark 
preservation act as applied to Grand Central 
Station did not constitute a taking; Supreme 
Court affirmed 
Brennan, joined 
by Stewart, White, 
Marshall, Blackmun, 
Powell 
Rehnquist, joined 
by Burger and 
Stevens 
United States brought action against marina 
Kaiser Aetna v. U.S. 
owners claiming their marina was subject to 
navigational servitude; Ct. App. held in favor 
Rehnquist, joined 
by Burger, Stewart, 
Blackmun, joined 
by Brennan and 
444 U.S. 164 (1979) of United States; Supreme Court reversed and White, Powell, Marshall 
held compensation was required if United Stevens 
States wanted marina open to public access 
··········································································································································································· 
Agins v. City of California Supreme Court held city did not 
Tiburon violate 5th/14th Amendments by restricting Powell (unanimous) 
447 U.S. 255 (1980) 	 future development of property; Supreme 
Court affirmed 
City rezoned industrial land; impacted 
San Diego Gas & petitioners' property; Cal. Ct. App. denied Blackmun, joined Brennan, joined by 
Electric Co. v. City damages for inverse condemnation; Supreme by Burger, White, Rehnquist Stewart, Marshall, 
ofSan Diego Court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction (Ct. Rehnquist, Stevens Powell
450 U.S. 621 (1981) App. decision not final) 
N.Y. Ct. App. held that temporary 
Loretto v. Marshall, joined permanent occupation of property did 
Teleprompter 	 by Burger, Powel, Blackmun, joined by not constitute a taking; Supreme Court 
Manhattan Rehnquist, Stevens, Brennan and White reversed/remanded for state court to 
458 U.S. 419 (1982) 	 O'Connordetermine appropriate compensation 
Hawaii Land Reform Act (to end O'Connor, joined 
concentrated land ownership) held Hawaii Housing by Burger, Brennan, 
Authority v. Midkiff White, Blackmun, unconstitutional by U.S. Ct. App.; Supreme 
Court reversed and remanded; act did not467 U.S. 229 (1984) Powell, Rehnquist, 
violate 5th Amendment Stevens 
Note: Marshall did notparticipate 
Bank sued claiming zoning laws constituted Blackmun, joined Brennan, joined by Williamson Country 	 a taking; Ct. App. reinstated damages as by Burger, Brennan, MarshallRPCv. Hamilton 	 just compensation, petitioner sought cert; WhiteMarshall, Rehnquist, Bank 	 Supreme Court reversed and remanded StevensO'Connor473 U.S. 172 (1985) 	 Note: Powell did notparticipate 
Landowner's subdivision plan rejected by 
county planning commission; landowner White, joined by 
MacDonald, claimed land restricted; constituted Stevens, joined by Burger and Powell, 
Sommer&Fratesv. deprivation of entire economic use; trial Brennan, Marshall, and Rehnquist 
Yolo County court held complaint failed to state c/a; Cal. Blackmun, joined in part 
477 U.S. 340 (1986) Ct. App. affirmed, Supreme Court affirmed; O'Connor Rehnquist, joined 
county board had not issued final definitive by Powell 
position regarding zoning restrictions 
Coal co. claimed portion of Pa. act that 
Keystone Bituminous regulated subsurface mining under structures Stevens, joined by Rehnquist, 
Coal v. DeBenedictis constituted taking; District Ct. held for Pa., Brennan, White, joined by Powell, 
480 U.S. 470 ( 1987) did not constitute a taking (public health Marshall, Blackmun O'Connor, Scalia 
regulation); Supreme Court affirmed 
First Evangelical 	 County barred construction in flood-prone 
Rehnquist, joined 
Lutheran Church v. 	 area; church claimed ordinance denied use Stevens, joined in 
by Brennan, White, 
County of 	 of its property; Cal. S. Ct. struck down claim part by Blackmun 
Marshall, Powell, 
Los Angeles 	 for damages; Cal. Ct. App. affirmed; Supreme and O'Connor
Scalia
482 U.S. 304 (1987) 	 Court reversed and remanded 
Commission conditioned permit sought by 
owners of beach front lot on their granting Brennan, joined by 
public easement across their land; claimed Nol/an v. Califomia 	 Scalia, joined by Marshall 
this was in violation of 5th Amendment; Coastal Commission Rehnquist, White, Blackmun
Cal. Ct. App. held coastal commission could 483 U.S. 835 (1987) 	 Powell, O'Connor Stevens, joined by condition permit on easement; Supreme 
BlackmunCourt reversed and held it required just 
compensation 
(continued) 
City mobile home rent control ordinance O'Connor, joined by 
Yee v. City of 	 challenged-petitioners claimed it BlackmunRehnquist, White, 
Escondido 	 amounted to physical taking; Cal. trial Stevens, Scalia, 	 Souter
503 U.S. 519 (1992) 	 and appellate cts. held ordinance did not Kennedy, Thomas
constitute a taking; Supreme Court affirmed ........................................................................................................................................................................... 

Lucas v. South 
Carolina Coastal 
Council 
505 U.S. 1003 
(1992) 
Beachfront Management Act prevented 
Lucas from building on his lots (owned prior 
to enactment of statute); trial ct. held land 
valueless; S.C. Sup. Ct. reversed and held 
no taking occurred; Supreme Court reversed 
and remanded 
Scalia, joined by 
Rehnquist, White, 
O'Connor, Thomas 
Kennedy 
Blackmun 
Stevens 
Souter (cert 
improperly granted) 
City conditioned Dolan's permit on 
Dolan v. City of 
Tigard 
512 U.S.374(1994) 
dedicating property for a ftoodway and 
public bike path; Dolan claimed this was a 
taking; Or. Supreme Court held conditions 
reasonable; Supreme Court reversed-
city did not establish conditions were 
Rehnquist, joined 
by O'Connor, Scalia, 
Kennedy, Thomas 
Stevens, joined 
by Blackmun and 
Ginsburg 
Souter 
proportionate to impact of development ........................................................................................................................................................................... 

TRPA determined Suitum's land was 
ineligible for development, but deniedSuitum v. Tahoe 
relief; Sui tum claimed a taking; lower ct 	 Scalia, joined Regional Planning 	 Souter (unanimous 
determined petition not ripe; Supreme 	 by Thomas andAgent)' 	 in pertinent part)
Court vacated lower ct. determinations and 	 O'Connor520 U.S. 725 (1997) 
held that case was ripe because TRPA had 
made final determination 
··· · ················ · ····· · ··6~~~,~~-~; -~i~i·.:i;~-.:i -~·~1~;.;£~·,· <l-~~-;i~~;;~~ · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · s~~-,;~· ··············································· 
City ofMonterey v. of property after rejection of development Kennedy, joined by Souter, joined by 
Del Monte Dunes plan for beachfront property; jury found for Rehnquist, Stevens, O'Connor, Ginsburg, 
526 U.S. 687 (l 999) developer; appellate ct. affirmed; Supreme Scalia, Thomas Breyer (concurring 
Court affirmed--<leprivation of use of in part and 
property was up to jury to determine dissenting in part) 
Resource management council deemed Kennedy, joined 
Palazollo's land protected coastal wetland Palazzolo v. Rhode by Rehnquist, O'Connor Ginsburg, joined by 
and eventual application to fill propertyIsland O'Connor, Scalia, Scalia Souter and Breyer was denied; state ct. rejected takings claim; 533 U.S. 606 (2001) Thomas and in part 	 BreyerSupreme Court affirmed in part and reversed 	 Stevens 
by Stevens 
in pare, remanded for further proceedings 
··········································································································································································· 
Agency imposed temporary moratoria on 
development of lakefront; landowners claimed Rehnquist, joined Tahoe-Sierra 	 Stevens, joined by 
deprivation of all viable economic use; district 	 by Scalia and Preservation Council 	 O'Connor, Kennedy, 
ct. held taking occurred; ct. app. reversed; 	 Thomas v. TahoeRPA 	 Souter, Ginsburg, 
Supreme Court affirmed app. ct.-no taking 	 Thomas, joined by 535 U.S. 302 (2002) 	 Breyeroccurred, finding taking in every temporary Scalia 
situation would be unreasonable ........................................................................................................................................................................... 

Chevron claimed cap on rent for company­
owned service stations was unconstitutional 
Lingle v. Chevron taking; District ct. held rent cap was in O'Connor Kennedy
544 U.S. 528 (2005) violation of 5th/14th Amendments; ct. app (unanimous) 
affirmed; Supreme Court reversed 
Hotel owners sued claiming that ordinance 
San Remo Hotel v. 
requiring in lieu fee to convert to tourist Stevens, joined Rehnquist, joined 
City/County ofSan 
hotel was a taking; state court rejected by Scalia, Souter, by O'Connor, Not applicableFrancisco 
claim; U.S. Ct. app. rejected takings claims; Ginsburg, Breyer Kennedy, Thomas545 U.S. 323 (2005) 
Supreme Court affirmed 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
City initiated condemnation proceedings on 
nine properties; trial court prohibited taking; O'Connor, joined by Keio v. City of 	 Stevens, joined by 
Conn. Supreme Court reversed and upheld 	 Rehnquist, Scalia, New London 	 Kennedy, Souter, Kennedy
takings; Supreme Court affirmed Conn. 	 Thomas545 U.S. 469 (2005) 	 Ginsburg, Breyer 
Supreme Court-economic development Thomas 
constituted public use 
··········································································································································································· 
Beachfront property owners brought facial 
Stop the Beach takings challenge to Act providing for beach 
Renourishment v. restoration, claiming it had the effect of taking 
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Environmental 	 ruled there was no taking under state property Sotomayorin part) and joined 
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Stevens did not participate (owns beachfront 
property in Florida) 
Stevens was alone regarding the importance of the temporal 
question in First English, but his would become the majority 
view 15 years later in Tahoe-Sierra when the question of whether 
compensation was also constitutionally mandated for "normal 
delays" came before the Court. 
interest affected in Keystone as only the 
coal that would have to be left in place 
to avoid subsidence, rather than defin­
ing the property interest as the entire 
coal deposit. 
The segmentation issue was not 
new. In Pennsylvania Coal, Justices 
Holmes and Brandeis had disagreed 
on this point, with Holmes defining 
the property interest affected as the 
coal left in place and Brandeis as the 
entire coal mining enterprise. The issue 
had also been a factor in Penn Central, 
where the plaintiff's claim that its "air 
rights"-the right to develop the space 
above the existing terminal-were a 
separate property interest that had been 
taken when the Landmarks Commis­
sion denied it permission to build an 
office tower above the terminal. In 1978, 
Justice Stevens had joined Justice Reh­
nquist's dissent in Penn Central, finding 
a taking, in part because the "air rights" 
above the terminal were a recognizable 
property interest.39 By 1987, his views 
had changed. 
Justice Stevens was a dissenter in the 
other two cases decided in 1987, First 
English 40 and No//an. 41 First English, a 
6-3 decision, at last resolved the com­
pensatory question. Rehnquist's opinion 
held that the Just Compensation Clause 
of the Fifth Amendment allowed a prop­
erty owner to recover damages when a 
land use regulation affects a "temporary 
taking" of property. Stevens's dissent, 
joined by Blackmun and O'Connor as to 
the first and third of the following points, 
argued: (1) The Court should have 
found that the county ordinance at issue, 
which prohibited permanent structures 
in an area prone to flash floods that had 
recently claimed several lives, was not 
a taking; (2) the majority was wrong in 
ruling that compensation is the appropri­
ate remedy for a "temporary taking"; 
(3) the Court should have required the 
plaintiff to exhaust his state remedies 
before hearing the case; and (4) it is the 
Due Process Clause, rather than the 
Just Compensation Clause, that protects 
property owners from improper, unfair, or 
unnecessarily protracted governmental 
decision making. 
Here again we see the importance 
Justice Stevens placed on the temporal 
element. His dissent argued that 
"[r]egulations are three dimensional: 
They have depth, width and length." 
He explained that depth refers to the 
restrictions placed on the property, 
width refers to the amount of property 
burdened by the restrictions, and length 
refers to the duration of the restric­
tions.42 He then argued: "Just as it 
would be senseless to ignore these first 
two factors in assessing the economic ef­
fect of a regulation, one cannot conduct 
the inquiry without considering the 
duration of the restriction."43 Finally, he 
noted that the majority had excluded 
"normal delays in obtaining building 
permits, changes in zoning ordinances, 
variances and the like"44 from its com­
pensation rule and argued this was an 
artificial distinction based on the logic 
of the majority's reasoning. Stevens was 
alone regarding the importance of the 
temporal question in First English, but 
his would become the majority view 
15 years later in Tahoe-Sierra when the 
question of whether compensation was 
also constitutionally mandated for "nor­
mal delays" came before the Court. 
The last of the 1987 cases, No/Ian, 
was significant in three respects: (1) It 
was the first Supreme Court case since 
Pennsylvania Coal holding that a land 
use regulation violated the takings 
clause,45 (2) Justice Scalia's majority 
opinion was his first on the takings is­
sue, and (3) the case was the first in 
which the Court analyzed land use ex­
actions under the takings clause. Scalia 
held that a land use exaction was valid 
only if there was an "essential nexus" 
between the condition imposed on the 
property and the regulatory purpose for 
the condition; here, a requirement that 
the Nollans dedicate a lateral easement 
for public access across their beachfront 
property as a condition for obtain­
ing a permit to build a larger house. 
The Coastal Commission had claimed 
the easement was required to reduce 
obstacles to the public's viewing the 
beach, lower psychological obstacles 
to public use of the beach, and reduce 
beach congestion caused by the con­
struction of the Nollans' house. Scalia 
argued that requiring the dedication 
of an easement, a recognized property 
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interest, appropriately subjected the 
dedication requirement to heightened 
scrutiny and the commission had not 
sustained its burden of demonstrating 
that the condition it imposed substan­
tially advanced the interests it had cited 
to justify the requirement. In short, the 
commission could obtain an easement 
from the Nollans only through purchase 
or condemnation and payment of just 
compensation. 
There were three separate dissents, 
authored by Justices Brennan, Black­
mun, and Stevens, with four justices 
dissenting in total. It is intriguing to 
speculate whether the dissenters' views, 
in fact, might have garnered a major­
ity at some point in the Court's delib­
erations, since much of Justice Scalia's 
argument refutes Brennan's views in a 
manner more reminiscent of a dissent 
than a majority opinion. 
Justice Brennan's lengthy dissent, 
joined by Justice Marshall, argued that 
the majority had improperly subjected 
the dedication requirement to height­
ened scrutiny and, even though that 
standard was not required, the ease­
ment requirement could meet it. Inter­
estingly, these two justices had been 
part of the majority in First English. Jus­
tice Blackmun's much shorter dissent 
agreed with Brennan that heightened 
scrutiny was not required and noted 
that Justice Scalia's opinion did not im­
plicate the public-trust doctrine. Justice 
Stevens's dissent, joined by Blackmun, 
his fellow dissenter in First English, was 
essentially an "I told you so" taking 
Brennan to task for his San Diego Gas 
dissent arguing a compensation remedy 
was required for a temporary taking 
and for joining the majority adopting 
that rule in First English. 46 Stevens 
noted that although "[e]ven the wisest 
lawyers would have to acknowledge 
great uncertainty about the scope of the 
Court's takings jurisprudence," First 
English made local government pay a 
price for honestly misjudging the law in 
this uncertain area.47 He then softened 
that criticism, presumably in the hope 
of garnering Brennan's vote in a future 
takings case, by praising Brennan for 
recognizing that government needed 
some flexibility in mediating between 
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Justice Blackmun wrote a stinging dissent in Lucas that famously
I began, "Today the Court launches a missile to kill a mouse." 
the desires of private developers and 
the preservation of public resources, and 
implicitly encouraging him to recognize 
that his support for the compensation 
remedy may have been mistaken. 
JUSTICE STEVENS AND THE PROPERTY 
RIGHTS COURT 
It would be five years, however, before 
the Court heard Lucas v. South Caro­
lina Coastal Councif,48 its next land use 
takings case. In the meantime, Justice 
Brennan had retired in 1990 and the 
first President Bush appointed David 
Souter, a little-known state appeals 
court judge from New Hampshire to fill 
his seat. There were two other changes 
on the Court over that five-year pe­
riod. President Reagan had appointed 
Anthony Kennedy to replace Justice 
Powell in 1988 and Bush appointed 
Clarence Thomas to replace Justice 
Marshall in 1991. In each of these cases, 
as well as the appointment of Justice 
O'Connor to replace Justice Stewart in 
1981, the new Justice was more conser­
vative than his or her predecessor. The 
Thomas appointment was particularly 
critical. Marshall had been favorable to 
Stevens's view of the takings clause in 
Keystone and Nollan; Thomas clearly 
would favor Scalia's view. As a result, 
the 1992 Court that considered Lucas 
was markedly more conservative than 
the 1987 Court which had decided the 
"takings trilogy." 
In Lucas, Justice Scalia, joined by Jus­
tices Rehnquist, White, O'Connor, and 
Thomas, announced the Court's second 
"categorical" taking rule: A regulation 
that denied all economically viable use 
of property was a taking without regard 
to the purported governmental interest 
served unless the restriction imposed 
by the regulation either inhered in the 
title to the property or could have been 
achieved under the state's common law 
of property. Applying this rule, Scalia 
found that the South Carolina coastal 
management statute had prohibited 
David Lucas from developing his two 
beachfront lots and thus was an unlawful 
taking of his property. Scalia noted that 
the legislature could not lawfully deny 
all use even if the stated purpose of its 
regulation was to prevent a harm, includ­
ing preventing a "noxious use" of pri­
vate property. "Any limitation so severe 
cannot be newly legislated or decreed 
(without compensation) but must inhere 
in the title itself, in the restrictions that 
background principles of the State's law 
of property and nuisance already place 
upon land ownership, he wrote. 49 
Justice Kennedy concurred in the 
judgment, but wrote separately to dis­
agree with Justice Scalia's view that a 
state could not enact new regulatory 
initiatives that would impose severe 
restrictions on property without having 
to pay compensation to the affected 
property owners, arguing that "[t]he 
common law of nuisance is too narrow 
a confine for the exercise of regulatory 
power in a complex and interdependent 
society." 50 As we will see, Kennedy's 
concurring opinion in Lucas was a signal 
that Justice Scalia apparently chose to 
overlook but Stevens did not. 
Justice Blackmun wrote a stinging 
dissent in Lucas that famously began, "To­
day the Court launches a missile to kill a 
mouse."51 
Justice Stevens's dissent disagreed with 
Justice Scalia's new categorical rule on a 
number of grounds. For one, he thought it 
was arbitrary, noting that a regulation that 
reduced property values by 95 percent 
would now be treated very differently 
from one that reduced property value by 
100 percent. The rule also implicated his 
concerns with the segmentation issue: 
"... developers and investors may market 
specialized estates to take advantage of 
the Court's new rule. The smaller the 
estate, the more likely that a regulatory 
change will effect a total taking." 52 He 
also saw the "denial of all use" standard 
as concerned too much with the effect 
of the regulation and not enough with 
the reason for the regulation. Here, be­
cause the challenged statute affected all 
coastal property owners in an effort to 
prevent serious harm, Stevens did not 
view the law as "singling out" any par­
ticular property owner to bear an unfair 
burden and thus the law was not a tak­
ing. Stevens analogized the effect of the 
statute to the Court's First Amendment 
cases, and in particular Scalia's recent 
and controversial opinion in Smith, 
which upheld neutral laws of general 
applicability even when they imposed a 
substantial burden on the free exercise 
of religion.53 Stevens argued: "[If] such a 
neutral law of general applicability may 
severely burden constitutionally pro­
tected interests in liberty, a comparable 
burden on property owners should not 
be considered unreasonably onerous."54 
Justice Scalia continued to press his 
property rights agenda over the follow­
ing decade, but arguably was not as suc­
cessful as he might have hoped. In the 
Court's next takings case, Dolan v. Ciry 
o/Tigard,55 an exactions case like No/­
fan, Chief Justice Rehnquist's majority 
opinion was joined by Justices O'Connor, 
Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas. Rehnquist 
had no trouble agreeing that the exaction 
here satisfied Noffan's essential nexus 
requirement. As a result, the Court now 
had to decide "whether the degree of the 
exactions demanded by the city's permit 
conditions bears the required relation­
ship to the projected impact of petition­
er's proposed development," a question 
the Court had not reached in Noffan be­
cause that exaction had failed the essen­
tial nexus test. After acknowledging that 
the various state courts which had ad­
dressed this issue had crafted standards 
ranging from lax to exacting, the Court 
adopted a "rough proportionality" test56 
similar to the "reasonable relationship" 
test used by the majority of states. Ap­
plying that test, the Court ruled that the 
city had not met its burden of proof with 
regard to the exactions it had demanded 
and remanded the case to give the city 
an opportunity to meet the Court's just 
announced test. 57 
Justice Stevens dissented, joined 
by Justices Blackmun and Ruth Bader 
Ginsburg, who had been appointed to 
fill the seat vacated when Justice White 
retired in 1993. Stevens 's dissent echoes 
what should now be familiar themes in 
his view of the takings clause, concerns 
about the segmentation issue and the 
need for the Court to give government 
adequate leeway in mediating between 
private and public interests. As regards 
segmentation, Stevens criticized the 
Court's preoccupation with the segment 
of the property subject to the exaction 
rather than looking to the entire prop­
erty, and particularly the question of 
In Del Monte Dunes, Justice Stevens parted company with the 
liberal justices and joined Justice Kennedy's majority opinion, 
along with Justices Rehnquist, Scalia, and Thomas, upholding 
a jury verdict finding a taking and awarding compensation. 
whether the required dedication might 
benefit the property owner to some 
extent. On the second point, Stevens 
argued that the majority was wrong to 
place the burden on government to 
justify its dedication by meeting the 
new "rough proportionality" test, argu­
ing: "[T]he burden of demonstrating 
that those conditions have unreasonably 
impaired the economic value of the pro­
posed improvement belongs squarely 
on the shoulders of the party challeng­
ing the state action's constitutionality. 
That allocation of burdens has served 
us well in the past. The Court has stum­
bled badly today by reversing it."58 Jus­
tice Souter's separate dissent essentially 
agreed with Stevens on this point.59 
Dolan was Justice Blackmun's last 
land use case. He retired in the sum­
mer of 1994 and was replaced by Justice 
Stephen Breyer. The membership of 
the Court would then remain stable 
for 11 years, the second longest period 
without a change in composition in the 
Court's history. This Court could easily 
be seen as divided into three groups: 
Justices Rehnquist, Scalia, and Thomas 
were avowedly conservative; Justices 
Stevens, Ginsburg, Breyer, and increas­
ingly Souter, were liberal; and Justices 
O'Connor and Kennedy were some­
where in between. The Court's subse­
quent takings cases would now largely 
be decided on the basis of whether Scalia 
or Stevens could gain the support of one, 
or both, of the justices in the middle. 
But the Court's next three takings 
cases, Suitum v. Tahoe Regional Planning 
Agency60 in 1997, City ofMonterey v. Del 
Monte Dunes61 in 1999, and Palazzolo 
v. Rhode Islanrf°Z in 2001, failed to pit 
Stevens and Scalia as rivals seeking to 
attract four other justices to his view. In 
Suitum, Justice Souter announced the 
Court's unanimous judgment revers­
ing a Ninth Circuit ruling that a tak­
ings claim was not ripe and remanded 
the matter. Justice Scalia's concur­
rence, joined by Justices Thomas and 
O'Connor, argued that Souter's opinion 
should not have discussed the availabil­
ity and potential value of Transferable 
Development Rights (TDRs) as rel­
evant to the issue of whether there had 
been a taking, because the availability 
ofTDRs properly goes to the question 
of whether there has been just compen­
sation after a taking is found. 
In Del Monte Dunes, Justice Stevens 
parted company with the liberal justices 
and joined Justice Kennedy's majority 
opinion, along with Justices Rehnquist, 
Scalia, and Thomas, upholding a jury 
verdict finding a taking and awarding 
compensation. The facts in this case 
showed that the city had, over a five-year 
period, denied approval for development 
five separate times, each time suggesting 
that if the developer would only address 
the city's concerns, all would be well 
when the developer reapplied. After 19 
separate site plans had been rejected 
because the city's concerns were contin­
ually shifting, the developer sued. These 
facts, showing government unfairly 
burdening a specific land owner are, of 
course, the key to Stevens's vote. From 
the standpoint of takings jurisprudence, 
however, the most important ruling in 
Del Monte Dunes was the rejection by all 
the Justices of the Ninth Circuit's rul­
ing that Dolan's "rough proportionality" 
standard should be applied to all takings 
claims based on the "fails to substantially 
advance" prong of Agins in takings cases, 
rather than limited to claims involving 
exactions. 
In Palazzo/lo, Justice Scalia's adversary 
was Justice O'Connor, not Justice Ste­
vens. The Court was unusually fractured 
here, producing six separate opinions. 
Justice Kennedy's majority opinion was 
joined by Justices Rehnquist, O'Connor, 
Scalia, Thomas, and in part, by Stevens. 
But Stevens also wrote separately, con­
curring in part and dissenting in part. 
O'Connor and Scalia wrote concurring 
opinions, each taking the other to task, 
albeit O'Connor doing so less harshly 
than Scalia. Justice Ginsburg's dissent 
was joined by Justices Souter and Breyer, 
who also dissented separately. The most 
critical issue before the Court here was 
the "notice" rule, which held that a land 
owner who had notice of a regulation at 
the time he acquired the property was 
barred from bringing a takings claim 
based on that regulation. The majority 
rejected the "notice" rule, but Scalia and 
O'Connor bickered over what role hav­
ing preacquisition notice of a regulation 
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should play in determining an owner's 
"reasonable investment-backed expecta­
tions" as part of a Penn Central analysis. 
O'Connor argued that because "[t]he 
regulatory regime in place at the time the 
claimant acquires the property at issue 
helps to shape the reasonableness of those 
expectations,"63 it must be considered. 
In his concurrence, Scalia took direct aim 
at Justice O'Connor: "I write separately 
to make clear that my understanding of 
how the issues discussed in ... the Court's 
opinion must be considered on remand 
is not Justice O'Connor's."64 He argued 
that notice should play no role in a Penn 
Central takings analysis because doing 
otherwise would only allow the govern­
ment to benefit from its own misdeed in 
enacting the unconstitutional regulation 
in the first place. 65 
Stevens's separate opinion showed 
that the temporal element remained 
critical in his view of the takings clause. 
Arguing that "[p]recise specification of 
the moment a taking occurred and of 
the nature of the property interest taken 
is necessary in order to determine an 
appropriately compensatory remedy," 66 
he concluded that either the claimant 
here was not the proper party to bring 
the claim, because the taking occurred 
before he owned the property, or "if the 
only viable takings claim has a different 
predicate that arose later, that claim is 
not ripe." 67 
AND THE WINNER IS ... JUSTICE STEVENS 
Between 2002 and 2005, the Court ruled 
on three land use takings cases: Tahoe­
Sierra, San Remo, and Keio. A fourth 
case, Lingle, although not itself a land 
use case, overruled a previous land use 
takings case, Agins. Justice Stevens was 
in the majority in each of these and au­
thored all of the opinions except Lingle. 
Although Justice Scalia did not dissent 
from the Court's unanimous opinion 
in Lingle, and joined Stevens's majority 
opinion in San Remo, he was in the mi­
nority in Tahoe-Sierra and Keio, the two 
cases where the "property rights" view 
of the takings clause was really at issue. 
It was clear that the Court's acceptance 
of that view of the takings clause over 
the past 15 years, as could be seen from 
the majorities which favored the com­
The reason for the moratorium-ensuring the continued protec­
tion of Lake Tahoe-would provide a benefit in return for the 
burden of the moratorium, thus effectively providing an "average 
reciprocity of advantage." 
pensatory remedy in First English, the 
heightened standard of review for exac­
tions in Nol/an and Dolan, the categori­
cal "denial of all use" takings rule in 
Lucas, the approval of the jury's award of 
damages for a taking in Del Monte Dunes, 
and the invalidation of the "notice" rule 
as a bar to takings claims in Pa/azzol/o­
had come to an end. 
The Tahoe-Sierra68 case involved a 
challenge by almost 500 property owners 
to a series of moratoria halting develop­
ment for 32 months while the Tahoe Re­
gional Planning Agency (TRPA) prepared 
a new regional plan to protect Lake Ta­
hoe from degradation of its famously clear 
water due to the effects of new develop­
ment, such as increased stormwater runoff 
from impervious surfaces. The property 
owners had won at the federal district 
court. That lower court, after deciding 
that the moratoria were not a temporary 
taking under Penn Centrafs balancing test, 
ruled that they were a categorical "denial 
of all economically viable use" taking 
under Lucas during the 32 months of the 
moratoria, and ordered TRPA to pay dam­
ages to the property owners.69 
Both TRPA and the property own­
ers appealed. TRPA appealed the dis­
trict court's finding of a taking and the 
property owners appealed the district 
court's ruling that the total time period 
for the moratoria was 32 months, rather 
than a longer period for which they had 
argued. The property owners did not 
appeal the district court's denial of their 
Penn Central temporary takings claim. 
The Ninth Circuit ruled against the 
property owners and for TRPA, holding 
that the temporary takings doctrine an­
nounced in First English does not apply 
to temporary development moratoria 
because a temporary taking should not 
be considered a denial of all economi­
cally viable use under Lucas. 70 
Justice Stevens's opinion, joined by 
both Justices O'Connor and Kennedy 
in addition to Justices Souter, Ginsburg, 
and Breyer, involved all three of the is­
sues that shaped his view of the takings 
clause: the potential for manipulation of 
outcomes due to segmentation of prop­
erty interests; a concern for the tempo­
ral aspect of a regulation; and deference 
to general government regulations that 
sought to achieve legitimate public pur­
poses. Here, his first two concerns were 
merged, since the plaintiffs' Lucas claim 
rested on a temporal segmentation of 
their property interest: the 32-month 
period during which they argued they 
could make no economically viable use 
of their property. Stevens essentially ar­
gued that temporal segmentation could 
no more be a valid basis for finding a 
taking than would segmentation of just 
the portion of a property that could not 
be "used" due to a regulation, while the 
rest of the property was not so burdened 
or focusing just on the uses for a prop­
erty that a regulation prohibited when 
other economically viable uses were al­
lowed. In this view, Lucas's requirement 
of a denial of all economically viable use 
would not be satisfied by looking only 
at the period a moratorium was in effect, 
since the property affected by the mora­
torium would regain its value as soon as 
the moratorium was lifted. 
Regarding the third element in 
Justice Stevens 's view of the takings 
clause-support for general regulations 
that advance legitimate state interests­
he first noted that "with a temporary 
ban on development there is a lesser 
risk that individual landowners will be 
'singled out' to bear a special burden 
that should be shared by the public as 
a whole." The reason for the morato­
rium-ensuring the continued protec­
tion of Lake Tahoe-would provide a 
benefit in return for the burden of the 
moratorium, thus effectively providing 
an "average reciprocity of advantage." 
Viewed more broadly, Stevens's opin­
ion was a major blow to the "property 
rights" position. He garnered a majority 
of the Court to support his arguments 
that: (1) The First English temporary 
taking rule was not applicable when 
property could not be used for a period 
of time due to normal delays in the 
land use process, including moratoria, 
although noting that "[i]t may well be 
true that any moratorium that lasts for 
more than one year should be viewed 
with special skepticism";71 and (2) be­
cause the Lucas categorical taking rule 
applies only in "the 'extraordinary case' 
in which a regulation permanently de­
prives property of all value; the default 
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rule remains that, in the regulatory 
taking context, we require a more fact 
specific inquiry," or, in other words, Penn 
Central is the "default" takings rule. 72 
Chief Justice Rehnquist's dissent, ar­
guing that while "normal delays" should 
not be viewed as a temporary taking, 
a moratorium of this length should, at­
tracted only Justices Scalia and Thomas, 
the Court's most conservative justices. 
Thomas, joined only by Scalia, also dis­
sented, effectively arguing that any de­
lay that denied all use was a taking, with 
the length of the delay relevant only to 
the question of damages. 
Justice Stevens perhaps relied on 
more than just the force of his argu­
ments to craft a six-member majority: 
His opinion incorporates major portions 
of both Justice Kennedy's majority 
opinion and Justice O'Connor's concur­
rence in Palazollo. One has to believe 
that quoting at length in your opinion 
from justices whose votes you are seek­
ing to retain is not a mere coincidence, 
but rather an effective strategy. 
In 2005, the Court ruled on three more 
takings cases: Lingle, San Remo, and Keio. 
Lingle, in which the Court overturned the 
"fails to substantially advance" prong of 
Agins, and in the process greatly clarified 
takings doctrine, and San Remo, where 
the Court held that the federal full faith 
and credit statute precluded further liti­
gation in federal court of issues that had 
been resolved in a state court proceeding, 
were both decided unanimously. Keio, in 
contrast, was a 5-4 decision that featured 
an uncharacteristically strident dissent by 
Justice O'Connor. 
Lingle clarified takings doctrine in 
two aspects. First, Justice O'Connor's 
opinion argued that what unifies the 
Court's two categorical takings tests­
denial of all economically viable use 
(Lucas) and physical invasion/occupa­
tion (Loretto)-and the Penn Central bal­
ancing test, is that each seeks to identify 
whether a regulation is the functional 
equivalent of a "classic taking in which 
government directly appropriates pri­
vate property or ousts the owner from 
his domain." In other words, the unify­
ing factor among these tests is their 
direct focus "upon the severity of the 
burden that government imposes upon 
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Justice Stevens remained on the Court for five more terms, but 
Keio would be his last opportunity to present his views on the 
I takings clause in a land use case. 
private property rights." 73 In contrast, 
O'Connor argued, the Agins "substan­
tially advances" test "prescribes an in­
quiry in the natu_re of due process, not a 
takings test, and ... [thus] has no proper 
place in our takings jurisprudence." 74 
The fatal flaw in this approach is that 
"in stark contrast to the three regula­
tory takings tests discussed above, the 
'substantially advances' inquiry reveals 
nothing about the magnitude or charac­
ter of the burden a particular regulation 
imposes upon private property rights. 
Nor does it provide any information 
about how any regulatory burden is 
distributed among property owners. In 
consequence, this test does not help 
to identify those regulations whose ef­
fects are functionally comparable to 
government appropriation or invasion of 
private property; it is tethered neither 
to the text of the Takings Clause nor to 
the basic justification for allowing regu­
latory actions to be challenged under 
the Clause." 75 Thus, the "substantially 
advances" prong of Agins would no 
longer be good law. Justice O'Connor 
then clarified that while both No/Ian and 
Dolan had cited Agins' "substantially 
advances" language, the rule in those 
exactions cases is not affected by the 
rejection of the substantially advances 
test as a general takings inquiry. 76 Jus­
tice Kennedy added a brief concurring 
opinion noting that the decision "did 
not foreclose the possibility that a regu­
lation might be so arbitrary or irrational 
as to violate due process." 77 
One can see the influence of Justice 
Stevens's view of the takings clause in 
Justice O'Connor's opinion. Her empha­
sis on the failure of the "substantially ad­
vances" test to address the distributional 
effects of a regulation reflects Stevens 's 
concern about whether the burden of a 
regulation is shared generally as opposed 
to being imposed on only a few. 
Justice Stevens wrote the opinion for 
a unanimous Court in San Remo Hotel, 
LP. v. City and County ofSan Francisco,78 
a procedural decision that I will discuss 
only briefly. The Court took San Remo 
to resolve a split between the Second 
and Ninth Circuits regarding whether a 
plaintiff, who had been forced to seek 
compensation for a taking in state court 
as mandated by Williamson County, could 
then litigate that same takings claim 
in federal court. The Second Circuit 
had ruled that parties "who litigate 
state-law takings claims in state court 
involuntarily" pursuant to Williamson 
County cannot be precluded from having 
those same claims resolved in federal 
court.79 The Ninth Circuit, in San Remo, 
disagreed, holding that the federal full 
faith and credit statute requires federal 
courts to give preclusive effect to any 
state-court judgment that would have 
preclusive effect under the laws of the 
state in which the judgment was ren­
dered. Stevens's opinion agreed with the 
Ninth Circuit's position. Chief Justice 
Rehnquist's concurring opinion, joined 
by Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and 
Thomas, agreed that the full faith and 
credit statute precluded plaintiffs from 
relitigating a takings claim in federal 
court, but he also questioned whether 
Williamson County's requirement that a 
takings claimant must first seek compen­
sation in state court should be retained. 
Of the Court's three takings deci­
sions in 2005, Justice Stevens's majority 
opinion in Keio v. City ofNew London80 
by far received the most attention. In 
a very real sense, this had less to do 
with Stevens's opinion than with the 
uncharacteristically strident dissent au­
thored by Justice O'Connor. Stevens's 
opinion held that the city's exercise 
of its eminent domain power solely to 
achieve economic development goals 
satisfied the "public use" requirement 
of the takings clause. The mere fact 
that O'Connor dissented in Keio was a 
surprise, given that she had authored 
the majority opinion in Midkiff hold­
ing that the power of eminent domain 
was coextensive with the police power, 
but the tone of her dissent was a shock. 
Although long seen as a moderate oc­
cupying a centrist position on the Court, 
in Keio, O'Connor not only voted with 
Justices Rehnquist, Scalia, and Thomas, 
the most conservative members of the 
Court, but authored a dissent that rivals 
any by Scalia in rhetorical effect. 
Justice Stevens's carefully argued 
majority opinion stressed the various 
factors a court must examine to de­
termine whether the use of eminent 
domain for economic development is 
truly serving a legitimate public pur­
pose, rather than improperly promoting 
purely a private benefit. Most important 
was whether a city was acquiring the 
property within "the confines of an 
integrated development plan" that was 
adopted and implemented by means of 
a thorough and deliberative process.81 
But Justice O'Connor's dissent in­
sisted that the majority's ruling made 
nearly all private property "suscep­
tible to condemnation on the Court's 
theory."82 Hammering the point home, 
she declared: "The specter of condemna­
tion hangs over all property. Nothing is 
to prevent the State from replacing any 
Motel 6 with a Ritz-Carlton, any home 
with a shopping mall, or any farm with a 
factory." 83 O'Connor's inflamed rhetoric 
was immediately picked up and widely 
disseminated by advocates for the so 
called property-rights movement, as well 
as the media, perhaps because capital­
izing on the hyperbole of "replacing any 
Motel 6 with a Ritz-Carlton" proved irre­
sistible when compared with the parsed 
tone ofJustice Stevens's opinion. 
THE FUTURE? 
Justice Stevens remained on the Court for 
five more terms, but Keio would be his last 
opportunity to present his views on the 
takings clause in a land use case. Although 
the Court decided a takings case implicat­
ing land use regulation in June 2010,84 Ste­
vens did not participate because he owns 
beachfront property in Florida that could 
be affected by the Court's ruling. Even 
though Stevens recused himself, Stop the 
Beach Renourishment is worth examining 
briefly for the hints it provides as to the 
Court's direction in future takings cases 
with Stevens no longer on the bench. 
In Stop the Beach Renourishment, the 
Court considered a facial takings chal­
lenge to Florida's Beach and Shore 
Preservation Act brought by certain 
owners of beachfront property. The Act 
provides for the restoration and "re­
nourishment" of storm-eroded beaches; 
the basis for the property owners' claim 
was the effect beach restoration would 
have on defining their property lines, 
and particularly whether their private 
property would continue to extend 
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to the water's edge. The Florida Su­
preme Court had ruled that under state 
property law, when the state restores a 
beach by adding sand to land that had 
previously been under water, the newly 
added portion of the beach belongs to 
the state and not the abutting property 
owner. 
That ruling had two significant ef­
fects on the rights of the beachfront 
property owners: first, their property no 
longer extended to the water's edge, 
meaning portions of the now-restored 
dry sand beach in front of their homes 
were open to the public; and second, 
they could no longer claim accretions 
to the beach-the gradual and imper­
ceptible expansion of the beach due to 
waves depositing sand on the shore-as 
extending their private property. 
The Court was unanimous in finding 
that background principles of Florida 
state property law supported the state's 
position and thus there had been no 
taking. But the Court was evenly split 
on the question of whether there could 
be such a thing as a "judicial taking" 
of property. Justice Scalia, joined by 
Chief Justice Roberts and Justices 
Thomas and Alito, concluded that if a 
court declares that what was once an 
established right of private property no 
longer exists, it has taken that property 
in violation of the takings clause. Justice 
Kennedy, joined by Justices Sotomayor, 
Breyer, and Ginsburg, while agree­
ing with Scalia that there had been no 
taking, declined to join the portion of 
Scalia's opinion that claimed the judicial 
branch could effect a taking, arguing 
that this case did not require the Court 
to decide that question. 
What is most interesting about this 
case is that Justice Kennedy, the sole re­
maining "swing vote" on the Court, voted 
with the Court's liberals, rather than its 
conservatives, on the judicial taking ques­
tion and thus declined again to ally him­
self with Justice Scalia's "property rights" 
view of the takings clause. Kennedy 
had joined Justice Stevens's majority 
opinions in Tahoe-Sierra and Keio, but the 
composition of the Court had changed · 
considerably since Keio in 2005. On July 
1, 2005, Justice O'Connor unexpectedly 
announced her retirement. Two months 
later, Chief Justice Rehnquist died after 
battling cancer for several years. President 
George W. Bush appointed two conserva­
tive federal appeals court judges as their 
replacements: John Roberts as the new 
chief justice and Samuel Alito to replace 
O'Connor. Four year later, Justice Souter 
also resigned unexpectedly and was 
replaced by Sonia Sotomayor, a liberal 
Second Circuit judge. Thus, the Stop the 
Beach Renourishment Court, after Stevens 
recused himself, comprised four conserva­
tive justices (Roberts, Scalia, Thomas, and 
Alito) and three liberal justices (Breyer, 
Ginsburg, and Sotomayor), with Kennedy 
in the middle. It is worth noting that J us­
tice Scalia could not win over Kennedy 
as the critical fifth vote to establish the 
concept of a judicial taking. 
Justice Stevens departs the Court 
with his view of the takings clause pre­
dominant, rather than Justice Scalia's. 
The victories for Scalia's view of the tak­
ings clause in First English, Lucas, Nol/an/ 
Dolan and, to some extent, in Palazollo, 
have proved of far less import than was 
thought at the time these cases were 
decided. First English established that a 
compensatory remedy was required for a 
temporary taking, but the prevalence of 
Stevens's view opposing segmentation 
of property interests on either a physical 
or temporal basis, as seen in Palazollo 
and Tahoe-Sierra, blocked the expan­
sion of the compensation rule to include 
"normal delays" in permit approvals and 
most planning moratoria. 
The potential reach of First English 
was expanded by Palazollo's abolishing 
the notice rule as a bar to a takings claim, 
but that expansion was significantly 
limited because Justice Scalia failed to 
convince the Court that notice of an 
existing regulation should play no role 
in the Penn Central balancing test. Lucas 
has proved to be of little practical value 
to takings claimants because regulations 
that deprive property of all economi­
cally viable use are rare, and regulations 
that do have such an effect may well be 
grounded in background principles of a 
state's property law because they target 
nuisance-like uses of property. Finally, 
the heightened scrutiny required by 
Nol/an/Dolan has remained narrowly con­
fined to the exactions context. 
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